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STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY AROUND NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates a sample of 27 OECD countries to test whether national 
elections induce higher stock market volatility. It is found that the country-specific 
component of index return variance can easily double during the week around an 
Election Day, which shows that investors are surprised by the election outcome. 
Several factors, such as a narrow margin of victory, lack of compulsory voting laws, 
change in the political orientation of the government, or the failure to form a coalition 
with a majority of seats in parliament significantly contribute to the magnitude of the 
election shock. Our findings have important implications for the optimal strategies of 
risk-averse stock market investors and participants of the option markets. 
 
 
JEL classification: G11; G12; G14
 1
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A country’s politics can exert significant influence on its income distribution and 
prosperity. In democratic states, voters elect parties which best represent their 
personal beliefs and interests. According to partisan theory propounded by Hibbs 
(1977), leftist governments tend to prioritize the reduction of unemployment, whereas 
right-wing governments attribute higher social costs to inflation. Another influential 
theory presented by Nordhaus (1975) postulates that, irrespective of their political 
orientation, incumbents will pursue policies that maximize their chances of re-
election. As a result, they will try to self-servingly attune the business cycle to the 
timing of elections. The economy will be stimulated by unsustainable expansionary 
policies before the elections, and harsh actions aimed at curbing the resultant 
inflation will have to follow at the beginning of the new term of office. It has to be 
noted, however, that any policy-induced cycles in real activity will be ephemeral if the 
economic agents and voters have rational expectations (Alesina, 1987; Rogoff, 
1990). 
 
Several recent papers look at whether security returns are impacted by 
politics. Booth and Booth (2003) report that the U.S. stock market tends to perform 
better in the second half of the presidential term. This phenomenon could be a 
reflection of the political business cycle but can also be explained behaviorally. The 
authors argue that investors may be over-optimistic about the implications of the 
impending elections, but their optimism wears off quickly once the new administration 
fails to keep its election campaign promises. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) show 
that the market excess return was higher under Democrat than Republican 
presidencies throughout the period from 1927 to 1998. This anomaly cannot be 
explained away by variation in business condition proxies. Additional evidence is 
provided by Nofsinger (2004), who contends that the stock market is a barometer of 
public sentiment and its movements can indicate whether incumbents will be re-
elected.  
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Our inquiry adds to the discussion on the interplay between politics and stock 
prices in meaningful ways. Most of the previous empirical studies focus exclusively 
on U.S. data.1 Since elections are essentially rare events, the single-country 
approach leads to a small sample and many statistical problems specific to it. To 
overcome this obstacle, the data set compiled for this study covers 27 industrialized 
nations. Furthermore, the basic conceptual framework proposed here departs slightly 
from the convention adopted in prior literature. Instead of examining the fortunes of 
the stock market throughout the tenure of different administrations, this analysis 
concentrates on the return variability around election dates. Evidence of extreme 
price movements in these periods will lend support to the conjecture that market 
participants tend to be surprised by the actual election results.  
 
The investigation into return volatility is warranted on at least three grounds. 
First, the uncertainty about the election outcome has important implications for risk-
averse investors. Prior research has shown that investors are undiversified 
internationally and exhibit a significant home bias (French and Poterba, 1991; Baxter 
and Jermann, 1997). Since they hold predominantly domestic assets, the country-
specific political risk will not diffuse in their portfolios. Consequently, the sole event of 
elections in their home country could have serious implications for the risk level of 
their portfolios. Second, any market-wide fluctuations in response to election shocks 
will augment the systematic volatility of all stocks listed. It is therefore conceivable 
that option prices could increase around the time when voters cast their ballots. 
Finally, the results reported here can be of interest to pollsters as they provide 
indirect evidence on whether the accuracy of pre-election forecasts suffices for 
practical applications. An observation of substantial volatility hikes around an Election 
Day would indicate that the efforts to formulate precise predictions should be 
furthered and additional resources need to be directed towards this end.  
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides 
a systematic review of the techniques used in election forecasting, and discusses the 
accuracy of these techniques. Section 3 outlines the methodological framework in 
which the null hypothesis of no election surprise is tested. The description of the data 
set and discussion of empirical results follow in the two subsequent sections. 
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Sections 6 and 7 investigate the robustness of results and implications for investors. 
The last section concludes the paper.  
 
2. PREDICTING ELECTION OUTCOMES 
 
Public opinion surveying has become an integral part of today’s political landscape. 
In the heat of election campaigns, the results of major surveys appear as cover-page 
stories, and politicians commission private polls, which provide them with strategic 
information. Pre-election surveying has a long and intriguing history, but it has to be 
noted that many of the early polls were plagued with serious methodological 
problems, which rendered their predictions unreliable (Squire, 1988; Cahalan, 1989). 
It was not until the 1930s that scientific procedures such as quota sampling were 
introduced (Gallup and Robinson, 1938). Having realized the importance of 
appropriate sample selection, polltakers began improving their statistical apparatus, 
gradually moving towards probability sampling and other hybrid methods.  
 
When conducting a survey, canvassers can interview subjects face-to-face, 
either by intercepting them on the street or by visiting sampled households. The unit 
costs of face-to-face interviewing can be quite high, especially if attempts to create a 
geographically representative sample are made. For this reason, the polling industry 
abandoned this method and embraced telephone-based surveys. The phone 
numbers of respondents could be drawn at random from a telephone directory. 
However, to avoid any sample biases arising from the systematic exclusion of 
households with unlisted phone numbers, pollsters tend to use random digit dialing 
systems. Random digit dialing is employed by major American polling organizations 
in their presidential election polls (Voss et al., 1995). The results of recent research 
indicate that this technique may be soon superseded by the more cost-effective and 
reliable method of sampling from the voter registration lists (Green and Gerber, 
2003). 
 
The accuracy of survey-based projections may depend on multiple factors, 
such as sampling procedure, number of respondents, or correct identification of likely 
non-voters. With their reputation at stake, pollsters are motivated to reduce the 
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margin of error by applying the best techniques at their disposal, especially in the 
case of widely followed national elections. For this reason, the major pre-election 
surveys have enjoyed a reasonably good track record ever since scientific polling 
was adopted. It can be calculated from the data released by the National Council on 
Public Polls that the average absolute candidate error for all major U.S. presidential 
polls between 1936 and 2000 was 2.32%.2 
 
Election forecasting also embraces techniques other than polling. For 
instance, one could make use of the fact that election outcomes tend to correlate with 
macroeconomic variables (Kramer, 1971; Grier and McGarrity, 1998). This 
correlation is observed because many voters assess economic conditions 
retrospectively and hold incumbents accountable for the efficacy of their policies. Fair 
(1978) formalized this intuition by deriving a model which links the share of two-party 
vote to such factors as GDP growth and inflation. He made subsequent updates of 
his vote equation and provided forecasts for presidential elections (Fair 1982, 1988, 
1996, 2002). The ex-post within-sample prediction of Fair’s model has been correct 
with respect to the election winner in all but three presidential races held since 1916. 
The average absolute error of the out-of-sample forecasts in the ten elections starting 
from 1964 equaled 2.58% (Fair, 2004).  
 
In general, rational investors will strive to assess voter sentiment using all 
available sources of information, such as polls, macroeconomic data, electoral 
debates, or media reports. In an efficient market, their expectations will be 
aggregated into a consensus forecast, and stock prices will move to reflect it. A 
wealth of empirical evidence on how markets aggregate expectations of individual 
traders comes from the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM). These markets are operated 
by the faculty of Tippie College of Business at the University of Iowa and allow 
individuals to stake their money on future election results.  
 
The IEM is essentially a futures market where trading can be conducted over 
the Internet on a 24-hours-per-day basis. Different types of contracts are listed. In the 
presidential vote-share market, the contracts’ liquidation payoff is a dollar multiple of 
the popular vote percentage received by a given candidate. In the winner-takes-all 
market, contracts are defined as digital options with a payoff of $1 conditional on a 
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particular candidate winning the election. The design of the instruments traded on the 
IEM allows the expected election outcome to be easily extracted from the prevailing 
market prices. 3 
Prior research has documented that, although individual traders in the IEM 
show an inclination to overestimate the chances of their preferred candidate and 
often conduct suboptimal transactions, the market in aggregate is an exceptionally 
accurate predictor of the election result (Forsythe et al., 1999; Oliven and Rietz, 
2004). The efficiency of market prices seems to be assured by marginal traders who 
arbitrage away any existing judgment biases and pricing errors. The prices of 
contracts are a much better guide to the future than polls. An analysis of 15 national 
elections in six different countries performed by Berg et al. (2005) reveals that the 
absolute error of polls in the week before the election was 1.93%, compared with a 
1.58% average market error. Furthermore, the IEM outperformed over 70% of the 
long-horizon forecasts generated by polling organizations (Berg et al., 2003). New 
opinion-poll results did not drive the market prices and were merely a confirmation of 
the traders’ collective knowledge (Forsythe et al., 1992).  
 
The preceding discussion characterizes a broad spectrum of techniques and 
information that can be used to evaluate the mood of the electorate. The extant 
evidence indicates that reasonably accurate predictions of voters’ behavior can be 
formed, but whether stock market participants are surprised by the ultimate election 
outcome remains an open empirical question.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
We gauge the impact of elections on the second moment of return distribution using 
a volatility event-study approach. The analysis starts with isolating the country-
specific component of variance within a GARCH(1,1) framework: 
 
 ),0(~, ,,,
*
, titititti hNRR εεβα ++= , (3.1) 
 2 1,21,10, −− ++= tititi hh εγγγ , (3.2) 
where tiR ,  and 
*
tR  are the continuously compounded returns on the U.S. dollar 
denominated stock market index in country i and the global stock market index on 
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day t, respectively. ti,ε  denotes the country-specific part of index returns, and tih ,  
stands for its conditional volatility. 
 
 Eq. (3.1) and (3.2) are estimated jointly using the Maximum Likelihood method 
over a period immediately preceding the event window. The convention adopted in 
the literature for the type of event studies described by Brown and Warner (1985) is 
to use 250 daily returns to estimate the benchmark model. One year of daily 
observations, however, may be insufficient to accurately model GARCH processes, 
and a longer estimation window is called for. On the other hand, the use of an over-
expansive window will substantially cut the number of elections that can be included 
in our sample. Guided by these practical considerations and the results of Hwang 
and Pereira (in press), we have decided to choose an estimation period of 500 
trading days. 
 
 To measure abnormal volatility, one has to consider the variation in ti ,ε  around 
the event date in relation to its regular non-event level. The GARCH model may 
serve as a benchmark, as it can provide an indication of what the volatility would 
have been, had the election not occurred. A word of caution, however, is required. As 
it stands, Eq. (3.2) is a one-step-ahead forecast and will not generate an event-
independent projection. The immediate impact of an election, as measured by 0,iε , 
will have a bearing on the values of tih ,  for any t > 0. This issue can be easily 
resolved by making the volatility forecast conditional only on the information set 
available prior to the event. For this reason, the volatility benchmark for the k-th day 
of the event window is defined as a k-step-ahead forecast of the conditional variance 
based on the information set available on the last day of the estimation window t*: 
 [ ] 2 *,2121*,11211
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210**, ˆˆ)ˆˆ(ˆ)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ| ti
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ti
k
k
j
j
tkti hhE εγγγγγγγγγ −−
−
=
+ +++++=Ω ∑ . (3.3) 
 The distribution of the residuals during the event window can be described as 
[ ]( )*,, |,~ ttittti hEMARN Ω⋅ε , where Mt is the multiplicative effect of the event on 
volatility, ARt is the event-induced abnormal return, and t > t*. Under the null 
hypothesis that investors are not surprised by election outcomes, the value of 
parameter Mt should equal one. Note that, if the residuals were demeaned using the 
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cross-section average, they would be normally distributed with zero mean. Their 
variance, under the assumption of residual orthogonality, would be 
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 (3.4) 
where EIDRVi,t stands for the event-independent demeaned residual variance and N 
is the number of events included in the sample. 
 
 Since the objective of the study is to quantify the effect of elections on stock 
market volatility, Mt is the parameter of primary interest. The method of estimating 
this event-induced volatility multiple rests on combining residual standardization with 
a cross-sectional approach in the spirit of Boehmer et al. (1991) and Hillard and 
Savickas (2002). Note that the estimate tMˆ  can be calculated as the cross-sectional 
variance of demeaned residuals, standardized by the event-independent demeaned 
residual standard deviation [ ] 21,tiEIDRV : 
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where )ˆˆ(ˆ *,, ttiti RR βαε +−=  and t > t*.  
 Under the null hypothesis, the demeaned standardized residuals follow a 
standard normal distribution because Mt equals one. Consequently, the abnormal 
percentage change in volatility on any day t of the event window is )1ˆ( −tM . For an 
event window (n1,n2), the cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) can be calculated as 
 ( )1ˆ),( 1221 2
1
+−−


= ∑
=
nnMnnCAV
n
nt
t . (3.6) 
In the current setting, the null hypothesis of no impact can be expressed in the 
following way: 
 0),(: 210 =nnCAVH , (3.7) 
 
 which is equivalent to 
 ∑
=
−⋅+−=−2
1
)1()1()1(: 120
n
nt
t NnnNMH . (3.8) 
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 Since, under the null, Mt is a variance of N independent N(0,1) random 
variables, 2 1~)1(ˆ −− Nt NM χ  and ∑ = +−⋅−−2 1 122 )1()1(~)1(ˆn nt nnNt NM χ . The test statistic for the 
hypothesis stated in Eq. (3.7) is therefore 
 2 )1()1(21 12
2
1
~ˆ)1(),( +−⋅−
=
∑ ⋅−= nnNn
nt
tMNnn χφ . (3.9) 
 The inferences based on the theoretical test will not be robust if the 
assumptions of the underlying econometric model are violated. Potential 
complications may arise from non-normality, cross-sectional dependence, or 
autocorrelation of the regression residuals εi,t. To circumvent these problems and 
reinforce our results, the statistical significance of election impact is additionally 
tested using the bootstrap methodology of Efron (1979). More specifically, the 
cumulative abnormal volatility during the election period is compared with the 
empirical distribution of CAVs simulated under the null hypothesis. The iterative 
procedure for generating the empirical distribution can be described as follows: 
 
I. From the entire set of available countries and dates, randomly draw with 
replacement N country/date combinations to match the number of 
elections in the original sample.  
II. Compute the cumulative abnormal volatility using Eq. (3.6) for the 
randomly generated sample over the respective event window.  
III. Repeat steps I and II 5,000 times, and sort the collection of resulting 
CAVs in an ascending order to obtain the empirical distribution. The p-
value can be defined as the number of bootstrapped CAVs that exceed 
the CAV calculated for the original election sample, divided by the 
number of replications (i.e. 5,000).   
 
The changes in volatility are also linked to election and country characteristics 
by means of regression analysis. This inquiry closely follows the approach of 
Dubofsky (1991) and Clayton et al. (2005) in that the dependent variable is defined 
as the natural logarithm of the pre-event and event window volatility ratio. The 
application of the log transformation to the variance quotient reduces the skewness 
of the underlying data and thereby leads to more reliable t-statistics. The test 
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statistics and parameter standard errors are estimated using the heteroscedasticity-
consistent method of White (1980). A description of the independent variables used 
in the regressions follows in the data section.  
 
4. DATA 
 
 In an attempt to create a broad international sample, the authors compiled 
information on 27 industrialized nations. This includes all OECD countries, with the 
exception of Iceland, Luxembourg, and Slovakia. As of the time of writing this paper, 
Morgan Stanley Capital International Inc. (MSCI) did not provide data on stock 
market indexes for these three capital markets. The returns for the remaining 
countries were computed using the U.S. dollar denominated MSCI Country Indexes. 
These are value-weighted and adjusted for dividend payments. We have further 
chosen the MSCI World Index, which measures the performance of all developed 
equity markets, as a proxy for our global portfolio. The stock market data are sourced 
from Thomson Financial Datastream.  
 
Table 1 summarizes some important facts about the 27 countries and 134 
elections included in our sample. As can be seen from the table, we distinguish 
between countries where parliamentary elections are assumed to be the relevant 
events and countries where presidential elections are investigated instead. This 
distinction is crucial since we combine a panel of countries with heterogeneous 
political systems and diverse constitutional features.  
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Country Election type MSCI index starting date 
First election 
included 
Last election 
included 
Number of 
elections 
Australia Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 5-Mar-83 9-Oct-04 9 
Austria Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 24-Apr-83 24-Nov-02 7 
Belgium Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 13-Oct-85 18-May-03 6 
Canada Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 4-Sep-84 28-Jun-04 6 
Czech Republic Parliamentary 4-Jan-94 20-Jun-98 14-Jun-02 2 
Denmark Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 10-Jan-84 20-Nov-01 7 
Finland Parliamentary 1-Jan-87 17-Mar-91 16-Mar-03 4 
France Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 16-Mar-86 9-Jun-02 5 
Germany Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 3-Mar-83 22-Sep-02 6 
Greece Parliamentary 1-Jun-01 7-Mar-04 7-Mar-04 1 
Hungary Parliamentary 2-Jan-95 10-May-98 7-Apr-02 2 
Ireland Parliamentary 4-Jan-88 25-Nov-92 18-May-02 3 
Italy Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 26-Jun-83 13-May-01 6 
Japan Parliamentary 2-Jan-80 18-Dec-83 9-Nov-03 7 
Korea Presidential 1-Jan-88 18-Dec-92 19-Dec-02 3 
Mexico Presidential 1-Jan-88 21-Aug-94 2-Jul-00 2 
Netherlands Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 8-Sep-82 22-Jan-03 7 
New Zealand Parliamentary 2-Jan-87 27-Oct-90 27-Jul-02 5 
Norway Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 8-Sep-85 10-Sep-01 5 
Poland Parliamentary 1-Jan-93 21-Sep-97 23-Sep-01 2 
Portugal Parliamentary 4-Jan-88 6-Oct-91 17-Mar-02 4 
Spain Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 28-Oct-82 14-Mar-04 7 
Sweden Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 19-Sep-82 15-Sep-02 7 
Switzerland Parliamentary 2-Jan-80 23-Oct-83 19-Oct-03 6 
Turkey Parliamentary 4-Jan-88 20-Oct-91 3-Nov-02 4 
United Kingdom Parliamentary 1-Jan-80 9-Jun-83 7-Jun-01 5 
United States Presidential 1-Jan-80 6-Nov-84 2-Nov-04 6 
    Total 134 
 
Table 1: Data availability and sample composition 
 
Note: The first column lists all of the 27 countries included in our sample. The relevant type of election 
and the date from which daily stock prices for the respective MSCI Country Indexes became available in 
Datastream are given in the following two columns. For any given country, the first election included is 
the first election that took place at least 500 trading days after the index starting date. This sample 
selection requirement allows estimating the volatility benchmark model. The date of the last election 
included corresponds to the most recent election that took place before the end of 2004.  
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In states with a presidential system of government, a President holds the 
positions of both head of state and head of government. Countries with presidential 
systems include the United States, Mexico, and South Korea. Most of the countries in 
our sample, however, operate under parliamentary systems with a Premier or Prime 
Minister as the head of government, and a President or Monarch as the, sometimes 
merely symbolic, head of state. Since our intention is to investigate the volatility 
around those elections that determine the formation of national governments, we 
have to focus on presidential elections in presidential systems and parliamentary 
elections in parliamentary systems.  
 
Column 3 of Table 1 indicates the date from which daily observations on the 
respective MSCI Country Indexes can be downloaded from Datastream. For several 
countries, monthly observations became available prior to the dates reported in Table 
1. It has to be noted, however, that monthly sampling frequency is too low for the 
purposes of our inquiry. While the indexes for most of the developed markets start 
around January 1980, other countries do not have these data available until the end 
of the 1980s or even the beginning of the 1990s. In some cases, this can quite 
heavily cut the number of elections that qualify for inclusion in our sample. The 
relative paucity of data in the time-series dimension vividly highlights the merits of a 
large cross-section.  
 
Election dates were mostly obtained from Banks et al. (2004), Caramani 
(2000), and Lane et al. (1991). To double-check the integrity of these data, we 
conducted extensive newspaper and internet searches. For any given country, the 
date of the first election included is solely determined by the MSCI index starting 
date. Elections that took place in the first 500 trading days after the index starting 
date, however, had to be excluded from the sample. This restriction enables us to 
estimate the volatility benchmark model given in Eq. (3.1) and (3.2) for all of the 
events considered. The date of the last election included (column 5) corresponds to 
the last election that took place before the end of 2004.  
 
Column 6 reports the total number of elections for each of the countries. The 
maximum of nine elections for Australia can be explained by the early availability of 
index data for this country, combined with a relatively short election cycle of only 
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three years and a considerable number of early elections. The minimum of only one 
observation is linked to Greece, which has the shortest MSCI index series. For four 
countries, only two elections can be included. Among these are the Eastern 
European emerging markets of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, where stock 
exchanges were only re-established after the fall of communism at the beginning of 
the 1990s, and Mexico, where the first election that met international standards of 
democracy and transparency was not held until 1994. 
 
To pinpoint the determinants of election-induced volatility, we have 
constructed a comprehensive data set of explanatory variables. These variables are 
meant to provide further insights into the political, institutional, and socio-economic 
factors which could influence the magnitude of election shocks. More specifically, the 
following explanatory variables are considered: 
 
- Parliamentary (dummy variable) captures the difference between parliamentary 
and presidential systems.  
- Minority_Government (dummy variable) indicates elections in which a minority 
government – i.e. a cabinet in a parliamentary system that does not represent a 
majority of seats in parliament – is brought to office.  
- Margin_of_Victory is defined as the difference between the percentage of popular 
votes obtained by government coalition and opposition for parliamentary 
elections, and the corresponding difference between winner and runner-up for 
presidential races. 
- Number_of_Parties indicates the number of independent political parties involved 
in the government coalition for parliamentary systems. It takes a value of one for 
presidential systems.  
- ∆Orientation (dummy variable) indicates a change in the political orientation of the 
government, i.e. a shift from a left-wing to a right-wing government or vice versa. 4 
- Early_Election (dummy variable) marks early elections, i.e. elections that are 
called more than three months before the official end of the tenure of the 
incumbent administration. 5 
- Compulsory_Voting (dummy variable) indicates countries with mandatory voting 
laws. 
- Ln_Population is the natural logarithm of total population in a given country-year.  
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- Ln_GDP_per_Capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in a given 
country-year, measured in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 6 
 
The last two variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators 
database compiled by the World Bank. The main sources considered and 
consolidated for the construction of the political variables are Alesina and Roubini 
(1992), Banks et al. (2004), Beck et al. (2000), Caramani (2000), Müller and Strøm 
(2000), and Laver and Schofield (1998). The information on compulsory voting 
comes from a comprehensive archive of the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance.  
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables introduced 
above. Parliamentary elections account for 91.8% of our sample, and in almost one-
fourth of the cases, the winning government coalition does not have a majority of 
seats in the parliament. In some countries (especially Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden), minority governments are the rule rather than exception (Müller and Strøm, 
2000). This observation may partially explain the negative average victory margin of -
2.81%. Another explanation that can be offered for this negative mean is that most 
countries in our sample have incorporated majoritarian elements in their electoral 
systems, thereby favoring parties with higher vote shares. This implies that a popular 
vote share of less than 50% (obtained by either a single party or a multi-party 
coalition) is often sufficient for a majority of seats in parliament. The data reported in 
Table 2 also reveal that a median government coalition comprised two independent 
parties. 
 
In almost one-third of the cases, a change in the orientation of the government 
takes place, and 41.8% of the elections are called early. In some countries with 
endogenous election timing, governments may regularly be tempted to call early 
elections in order to exploit economic conditions which they judge more promising for 
their re-election (Cargill and Hutchison, 1991).  
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 Mean Standard deviation 25
th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
Parliamentary 0.9179 0.2755 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Minority_Government 0.2463 0.4325 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Margin_of_Victory -0.0281 0.2126 -0.1593 -0.0560 0.0592 
Number_of_Parties 2.2015 1.2965 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 
∆Orientation 0.3209 0.4686 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Early_Election 0.4179 0.4951 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Compulsory_Voting 0.2090 0.4081 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Ln_Population 16.8395 1.1945 15.8873 16.5974 17.8599 
Ln_GDP_per_Capita 9.7472 0.5781 9.5720 9.8729 10.0955 
  
 Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Note: Descriptive statistics for a set of variables that are likely to influence election-induced volatility are reported above. The 
data set consists of 134 elections held in 27 OECD countries. Parliamentary is a dummy variable which takes a value of one 
for parliamentary elections and zero for presidential elections. Minority_Government is a dummy variable which takes a value 
of one if the government fails to hold a majority of seats in parliament and zero otherwise. Margin_of_Victory is defined as the 
difference between the percentage of votes obtained by government and opposition for parliamentary elections and the 
corresponding difference between winner and runner-up for presidential elections. Number_of_Parties denotes the number of 
independent political parties involved in the government in parliamentary system, and takes a value of one for presidential 
system. ∆Orientation is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for a change in the political orientation of the 
government and zero otherwise. Early_Election takes a value of one when elections are called before time and zero 
otherwise. Compulsory_Voting takes a value of one if a given country has mandatory voting laws and zero otherwise. 
Ln_Population and Ln_GDP_per_Capita are the natural logarithms of total population and GDP per capita (in constant 2000 
US$) in a given country-year, respectively. 
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Six of the countries in our sample (Australia, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Mexico, 
and Turkey) have mandatory voting laws, but the stringency and enforcement of 
these laws appears to be country-specific. A non-voter could, for instance, face a 
fine, restrictions on employment in the public sector (Belgium), or difficulties in 
obtaining new identification documents (Greece). Finally, the population of the 
countries included in our sample ranges from 3.4 million (New Zealand 1990) to 294 
million (United States 2004), whereas GDP per capita varies between US$ 2,471 
(Turkey 1991) and US$ 38,222 (Japan 2003).  
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Return volatility around the election date 
Our empirical investigation starts with the volatility event study described in the 
methodology section. For the purposes of our inquiry, we define the event day as the 
Election Day, except for instances when elections took place during the weekend or 
on a bank holiday. In these cases, day zero is defined as the first trading day after 
the election. The first panel of Fig. 1 depicts the behavior of cumulative abnormal 
volatility around the vote-casting periods. The theoretical and bootstrap p-values for 
the null hypothesis of no increase in country-specific variance are plotted in the 
second and third panel. Both probabilities are truncated at 20%.  
 
 The plot depicted in Fig. 1 clearly demonstrates that elections are 
accompanied by elevated volatility. A strong abnormal rise starts on the Election Day 
and continues for a number of days thereafter. This prolonged reaction is most 
probably due to the fact that the official results may not be released until several days 
after the elections. The process of counting special votes 7 and possible recounts can 
substantially add to this delay. Furthermore, some of the abnormal volatility observed 
in the later days of the event window may also be attributed to ongoing coalition talks 
or statements issued by the newly elected authorities.  
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         Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal volatility around Election Day 
 
Note: The first panel plots the cumulative abnormal volatility around 134 national 
elections in 27 countries. The theoretical p-value shown in the second panel comes from 
a χ2 test for the null hypothesis of no change in the country-specific component of 
volatility. The last panel depicts the p-value based on the empirical distribution of 
cumulative abnormal volatilities generated using 5,000 bootstrap samples. Both the 
theoretical and bootstrap p-values are truncated at the 0.2 level. 
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Window ),( 21 nnCAV  
Implied percentage 
change 
Theoretical 
p-value 
Bootstrap 
p-value 
Panel A: Symmetric event windows 
(-2,2) 5.3675 107.3500 0.0000 0.0016 
(-5,5) 6.8504 62.2764 0.0000 0.0026 
(-10,10) 7.9387 37.8033 0.0000 0.0048 
(-25,25) 11.9437 23.4190 0.0000 0.0076 
Panel B: Asymmetric event windows 
(0,2) 5.3655 268.2750 0.0000 0.0000 
(0,5) 6.6115 132.2300 0.0000 0.0000 
(0,10) 7.2652 72.6520 0.0000 0.0018 
(0,25) 8.6725 34.6900 0.0000 0.0054 
 
Table 3: Cumulative abnormal volatility around Election Day 
 
Note: The data set consists of 134 elections held in 27 OECD countries. Panel A of the table reports 
cumulative abnormal volatility (CAV) in windows centered on the Election Day, whereas Panel B 
reports the results for asymmetric event windows. The implied percentage change in country-specific 
volatility relative to the benchmark is reported in the third column. Theoretical p-values come from a χ2 
test for the null hypothesis of no change in country-specific volatility. The last column reports bootstrap 
p-values obtained from the empirical distribution of CAVs developed under the null, using 5,000 
iterations. 
 
  
It can be seen from Table 3 that CAV(-25,25) reaches a value of 11.94. At first 
glance, this value may have little intuitive content. An astute reader, however, will 
realize that the ratio of CAV to the total number of days included in the event window 
is, by construction, equal to the percentage increase of the volatility relative to its 
benchmark. This means that, in the 51 days surrounding the elections, the country-
specific component of variance was 23.42% higher than it would have been, had the 
elections not occurred. Narrowing the event window leads to larger implied 
percentage changes, confirming that most of the large stock market moves are 
concentrated around the Election Day. The punch line of Table 3 is that the country-
specific return volatility can easily double in the week around elections.  
 
 Fig. 1 shows the probabilities for the null of no abnormal reaction in volatility. 
The probabilities drop to nearly zero immediately after the event date. This result is 
corroborated in Table 3 where, at the precision of four decimal places, most of the p-
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values are indistinguishable from zero. Regardless of the testing methodology, the 
null is rejected for all of the considered event windows at the 1% significance level or 
better. There are slight differences between the p-values produced by the theoretical 
and bootstrap approaches. The latter can be deemed more reliable, as it does not 
assume normality and independence of returns. Overall, very compelling evidence is 
found that the country-specific component of variance increases dramatically around 
the event date. 
 
5.2. Determinants of election surprise  
We proceed further by attempting to link the magnitude of election shocks to several 
explanatory variables by means of regression analysis. Following the approach 
adopted in prior literature (Dubofsky, 1991; Clayton et al., 2005), we define the 
dependent variable as a natural logarithm of the volatility ratio. This ratio is 
constructed by dividing the return variance computed over the (-25,25) event window 
by the variance of returns in a pre-event window of equal length, i.e. (-76,-26). To 
check the sensitivity of the regression estimates to the addition of new independent 
variables, several specifications were tried, and the results are reported in Table 4. 
As can be seen from the table, the Margin_of_Victory and Minority_Government 
variables are not bundled together into one equation in order to avoid potential 
multicollinearity problems. There is a strong negative correlation between these 
variables of almost -0.5, which is induced by the fact that minority governments 
typically have a negative margin of victory.   
 
 Table 4 reveals that the increase in variance is more pronounced for closely 
contested races. Whenever picking the probable winner is difficult, uncertainty will 
not resolve fully until the official release of election results. Investors also tend to 
react in a more volatile manner when the new government coalition does not hold a 
majority of seats in parliament. This could be, for instance, because the 
implementation of new policies by minority governments is usually a very arduous 
task. A change in the political orientation of the executive also adds to the volatility of 
stock prices, as investors anticipate new directions in economic and redistribution 
policies. 
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Expected sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 
 
? 
 
 0.1143* 
(0.0688) 
 0.1594 
(0.2385) 
 0.0526 
(0.2449) 
 0.0029 
(0.2495) 
 1.8998 
(1.8072) 
Margin_of_Victory 
 
- 
 
-0.6697** 
(0.3300) 
-0.6793** 
(0.3411) 
-0.7462** 
(0.3527)  
-0.7702** 
(0.3538) 
Parliamentary 
 
? 
  
-0.0494 
(0.2528) 
-0.2115 
(0.2740) 
-0.1713 
(0.2719) 
-0.2990 
(0.3414) 
Early_Election 
 
+ 
   
 0.0892 
(0.1403) 
 0.1376 
(0.1418) 
 0.1003 
(0.1478) 
∆Orientation 
 
+ 
   
 0.3229** 
(0.1430) 
 0.3805*** 
(0.1431) 
 0.2997** 
(0.1482) 
Compulsory_Voting 
 
- 
   
-0.3145** 
(0.1550) 
-0.2176 
(0.1556) 
-0.3651** 
(0.1701) 
Number_of_Parties 
 
+ 
   
 0.0811 
(0.0582) 
 0.0397 
(0.0552) 
 0.0933 
(0.0578) 
Minority_Government 
 
+ 
    
 0.2675* 
(0.1608)  
Ln_Population 
 
- 
     
-0.0356 
(0.0679) 
Ln_GDP_per_Capita 
 
- 
     
-0.1213 
(0.1221) 
Adjusted R2  2.56% 1.85% 6.08% 4.93% 5.52% 
 Table 4: Determinants of excess volatility 
Note: This table presents results of regressions linking election-induced volatility to several explanatory variables. The dependent 
variable is a natural logarithm of the volatility ratio, defined as a quotient of the return variance computed over the (-25,25) event window 
and the variance of returns in a pre-event window of equal length, i.e. (-76,-26). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of White 
(1980) are given in parentheses. The data set consists of 134 elections held in 27 OECD countries. Margin_of_Victory is defined as the 
difference between the percentage of votes obtained by government and opposition for parliamentary elections and the corresponding 
difference between winner and runner-up for presidential elections. Parliamentary is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for 
parliamentary elections and zero for presidential elections. Early_Election takes a value of one when elections are called before time 
and zero otherwise. ∆Orientation is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for a change in the political orientation of the 
government and zero otherwise. Compulsory_Voting takes a value of one if a given country has mandatory voting laws and zero 
otherwise. Number_of_Parties denotes the number of independent political parties involved in the government in parliamentary system, 
and takes a value of one for presidential system. Minority_Government is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the 
government fails to hold a majority of seats in parliament and zero otherwise. Ln_Population and Ln_GDP_per_Capita are the natural 
logarithms of total population and GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) in a given country-year, respectively. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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We find evidence that mandatory voting reduces the election surprise. At least 
two explanations can be propounded to explain this phenomenon. In the absence of 
compulsory voting laws, individuals holding extreme political views will show an 
above-average proclivity to vote and will be able to distort election outcomes. 
Furthermore, the precision of pre-election polls will depend on whether the 
interviewers have correctly determined which of the respondents are likely not to 
vote. Political preferences of voters and non-voters may be quite different, which will 
bias the survey predictions (Green and Gerber, 2003). With compulsory voting laws 
in place, both of the problems mentioned above are mitigated.   
 
 Although the remaining regressors lack significant explanatory power, the 
signs of their coefficient estimates appear to be uncontroversial. The jump in volatility 
is, ceteris paribus, greater for presidential races and in cases when the elections are 
called early. Formation of wide government coalitions comprising a large number of 
independent parties can further aggravate the stock market fluctuations. Finally, 
there seems to be less uncertainty about election outcomes in countries with large 
population and high GDP per capita, as numerous and affluent nations can allocate 
more resources to pre-election polling. 
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
The event study presented in the previous section focuses on the country-specific 
component of volatility. An obvious extension of this analysis would be to investigate 
the behavior of total variance, which is influenced by both domestic and international 
developments. Table 5 reports the average unconditional variances computed for 
different time intervals around the elections. These figures are subsequently 
compared with the estimates of average variances from the pre-event windows of 
equal length. The evidence indicates that a marked increase in unconditional volatility 
takes place around the election date. Wilcoxon signed-rank and Fisher tests are 
employed to affirm the statistical significance of this increase. Although the first of 
these tests has frequently been applied in the literature, to the best knowledge of the 
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authors there has not been a single application of the Fisher test in the event-study 
context as of yet. Consequently, some words of clarification are in order.  
 
 The design of the Fisher test has been inspired by the work of Fisher (1932) 
and Maddala and Wu (1999). The null hypothesis for this test can be written as 
 
 ,:0 iallforVarianceEventPreVarianceEventH ii −=  (6.1) 
 
against the alternative 
 
 ,:1 ioffractiontsignificanaforVarianceEventPreVarianceEventH ii −>  (6.2) 
 
where i = 1,…,N denotes the event subscript.  
 
Event 
window 
Event 
variance 
(%) 
Pre-event 
window 
Pre-event 
variance 
(%) 
Percentage 
change 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test 
Fisher test 
Panel A: Symmetric event windows 
(-2,2) 0.0166 (-7,-3) 0.0104 58.8283 2.9081*** 397.54*** 
(-5,5) 0.0165 (-16,-6) 0.0112 47.9641 5.4088*** 498.43*** 
(-10,10) 0.0159 (-31,-11) 0.0132 20.6038 2.9015*** 559.09*** 
(-25,25) 0.0158 (-76,-26) 0.0138 14.2509 2.3107** 908.30*** 
Panel B: Asymmetric event windows 
(0,2) 0.0138 (-3,-1) 0.0068 103.4263 2.8460*** 388.73*** 
(0,5) 0.0166 (-6,-1) 0.0106 56.1312 3.4234*** 418.39*** 
(0,10) 0.0164 (-11,-1) 0.0123 33.5528 3.9053*** 451.58*** 
(0,25) 0.0161 (-26,-1) 0.0134 20.1656 2.8748*** 610.43*** 
 
Table 5: Change in unconditional variance 
 
Note: This table reports the change in unconditional variance calculated for 134 elections held in 27 
OECD countries. Panel A of the table reports unconditional variances in windows centered on the 
Election Day, whereas Panel B reports the results for asymmetric event windows. In any row of the 
table, the event and pre-event windows have equal length. The event and pre-event variance denote the 
geometric averages of the unconditional variance estimators computed for all elections. The fifth column 
reports the percentage increase in average unconditional variance relative to its pre-event level. The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic follows a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of no 
change in variance. Given the validity of the null, the Fisher test statistic is χ2 distributed with 268 
degrees of freedom. 
***, ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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 Essentially, the null is a composite hypothesis because it imparts N sub-
hypotheses. One could test the variance constancy for each i using a simple F-test, 
and the significance level pi could be obtained. It follows that, under the null, 
( )ipln2−  is 2χ  distributed with two degrees of freedom and the ultimate test statistic 
( )∑ =−= Ni ipTestFisher 1ln2  has a 2χ  distribution with 2N degrees of freedom.  
 
Table 5 shows that, irrespective of the choice of the event window, both the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank and Fisher tests strongly reject the hypothesis of variance 
constancy. To illustrate the inflation in unconditional variance even further, we adopt 
a simple rolling regression approach which can be described as follows. Given any 
fixed day in the event window, we compute logged unconditional variances over the 
last 25 trading days for every election included in our sample. These logged 
variances are subsequently regressed against a constant term. This calculation is 
repeated for every day in the event window and the regression constants are plotted 
in Fig. 2. The pattern that emerges strongly attests to the existence of election 
surprise. 
 
Figure 2: Rolling regression intercept 
 
Note: Given any fixed day in the event window, logged unconditional variances over the 
last 25 trading days are computed for 134 elections included in our sample. The logged 
variances are subsequently regressed against a constant term. This calculation is 
repeated for every day in the event window, and the constant is plotted in the graph 
above. 
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7. IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS 
7.1. Compensation for risk 
It is commonsensical to expect increased return variability during periods of political 
change. It is, however, less obvious whether investors are adequately compensated 
for taking this political risk. To address this question, we conduct a simple event-
study analysis. We define abnormal returns as the difference between returns on the 
election country stock market index and the global index. The abnormal returns are 
subsequently averaged across all events and cumulated over the relevant event 
window (n1,n2) to obtain an estimate of cumulative abnormal return (CAR(n1,n2)). The 
statistical significance of CAR(n1,n2) is evaluated using the following t-statistic: 
 
 
)(ˆ)1(
),(
)),((
12
21
21
tARraVnn
nnCARnnCARt ⋅+−= , (7.1) 
 
 where )(ˆ tARraV  is the estimate of variance of the average abnormal returns 
computed in the time-series dimension.  
 
 The magnitude of CARs reported in Table 6 does not seem excessive. The 
additional compensation to an investor who is prepared to abandon a strategy of 
international diversification and invest all of her money in countries facing elections is 
about 33 basis points in the (-25,25) event window. None of the reported CARs in 
Table 6 is statistically significant, and several estimates for shorter sub-periods are 
negatively signed. Although the reported risk premiums appear quite modest, they 
would provide an adequate compensation if the average level of investors’ risk 
aversion was sufficiently low.  
 
Given certain assumptions, it can be shown (see Appendix) that a 
representative investor with constant relative risk aversion will be content with the risk 
compensation offered by the market if her relative risk-aversion (RRA) coefficient 
),( 21 nnγ  is below a certain break-point level ( )21 ,nnBγ . If, on the other hand, ),( 21 nnγ  
> ( )21 ,nnBγ , the optimal decision for the investor will be to cease investing all of her 
money in countries awaiting elections and pursue a strategy of international portfolio 
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diversification. The parameter ( )21 ,nnBγ  can be estimated from the underlying data 
as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]21*212121 ,~ˆ,~ˆ,21,ˆ nnRraVnnRraVnnCARnn iB −÷+=γ , (7.2) 
 
 where ),(~ 21 nnRi  and ),(
~
21
* nnR  are the cumulative log returns on the election 
country index and the global index, respectively. ( )[ ]21 ,~ˆ nnRraV i  and ( )[ ]21* ,~ˆ nnRraV  
denote the estimates of cross-sectional variances thereof.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal return around Election Day 
 
Note: The abnormal returns are defined as the difference between returns on the election 
country stock market index and the global index. The abnormal returns are subsequently 
averaged across all 134 elections and cumulated over the relevant event window. The 
resulting estimate of cumulative abnormal return is plotted above.  
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Window ),( 21 nnCAR in % t-statistic p-value RRA coefficient 
Panel A: Symmetric event windows 
(-2,2) 0.2283 0.4865 0.6274 3.9980 
(-5,5) 0.5480 0.9937 0.3221 4.2057 
(-10,10) 0.1699 0.2580 0.7968 1.5848 
(-25,25) 0.3297 0.3456 0.7302 1.5696 
Panel B: Asymmetric event windows 
(0,2) -0.2512 -0.9123 0.3632 -2.2143 
(0,5) -0.3187 -1.1960 0.2338 -0.7994 
(0,10) -0.3738 -1.1421 0.2555 -0.7150 
(0,25) 0.3182 0.4830 0.6299 1.9644 
 
Table 6: Cumulative abnormal returns around Election Day 
 
Note: This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated around 134 elections held in 
27 OECD countries. Panel A of the table reports CARs in windows centered on the Election Day, 
whereas Panel B reports the results for asymmetric event windows. CAR is defined as the average 
excess return on the election country index over the MSCI World Index, cumulated over time. The t-
statistics with the corresponding p-values are calculated for the null hypothesis of no compensation for 
the election risk. The RRA coefficient denotes the break-point level of the constant relative risk-
aversion coefficient above which the strategy of international portfolio diversification yields higher 
expected utility than the strategy of investing in election countries.  
 
The task of drawing any generalized conclusions, at this stage, should be 
approached with great caution, especially given the fact that the literature does not 
provide any consensus estimate of the average investors’ risk aversion. An analysis 
of households’ asset composition by Friend and Blume (1975) reveals that the RRA 
coefficient is slightly above two. Gertner (1993) examines risky decisions of 
contestants on the television game show “Card Sharks” and reports a lower bound 
for the risk-aversion estimate of 4.8. A similar study of the Dutch word game “Lingo” 
by Beetsma and Schotman (2001) concludes that the parameter is close to seven. 
Last but not least, the risk-aversion coefficient that is needed to explain the 
magnitude of the historical equity premium in the United States is around 19 (Mehra 
and Prescott, 1985; Campbell et al., 1997).  
 
The academic discussion on the risk attitudes of a representative agent is 
unlikely to be settled in the near future. Our pragmatic recommendation for anyone 
who considers investment in a country facing an election, however, would be to 
measure their own RRA coefficient. This individual estimate should be subsequently 
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compared with the figures reported in the last column of Table 6 in order to determine 
the optimal choice of strategy. It can be seen that an investment over the longest 
event window requires a risk-aversion coefficient of less than 1.57. Furthermore, one 
would have to exhibit risk-loving behavior to benefit from investments made on the 
Election Day and liquidated within the next two weeks. A robust conclusion that can 
be reached is that everyone with an RRA coefficient greater than 4.21 should 
definitely avoid investing all of their money in a country with upcoming elections. The 
compensation for risk will, in this case, be incommensurate and the strategy of 
international portfolio diversification will yield higher expected utility.  
 
7.2. Option pricing and possible trading strategies 
Savvy investors are likely to realize that the stock market tends to be mercurial in 
nature during election periods. If they incorporate this information into their decision-
making, prices of financial options will move to reflect it. This nexus between option 
market and political risk has not gone completely unnoticed in the literature. Gemmill 
(1992) reports that, in the last two weeks of the British 1987 election campaign, 
implied volatility of the FTSE 100 options almost doubled. Sharp increases were also 
observed for blue-chip companies that were likely to be renationalized if Labour won 
the election. These results illustrate the strong interdependence between the spot 
and option markets.  
 
 We check whether the findings of Gemmill (1992) can be reconfirmed in an 
international sample. The implied volatility indexes are, however, unavailable for 
many of the countries considered, and most of them have not been constructed until 
the turn of this decade. The available data permit an analysis of option market 
behavior around 15 elections in 11 countries. The time series are sourced from 
Thomson Financial Datastream and an exact description of the sample composition 
can be found in Table 7. Given the data at hand, an average implied volatility is 
computed across all elections and plotted in Fig. 4. 
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Country Datastream code Index starting date 
First election 
included 
Last election 
included 
Number of 
elections 
Austria ATXC.SERIESC 21-Jul-99 03-Oct-99 24-Nov-02 2 
Czech Republic CTXC.SERIESC 16-Feb-00 14-Jun-02 14-Jun-02 1 
France CACLC.SERIESC 5-Jan-00 9-Jun-02 9-Jun-02 1 
Germany DAXC.SERIESC 19-Jul-99 22-Sep-02 22-Sep-02 1 
Japan JPNC.SERIESC 10-Mar-00 25-Jun-00 9-Nov-03 2 
Mexico MEXC.SERIESC 10-Mar-00 02-Jul-00 2-Jul-00 1 
Netherlands EOEC.SERIESC 24-Aug-99 15-May-02 22-Jan-03 2 
Poland PTXC.SERIESC 16-Feb-00 23-Sep-01 23-Sep-01 1 
Switzerland SMIC.SERIESC 1-Mar-00 19-Oct-03 19-Oct-03 1 
United Kingdom LSXC.SERIESC 05-Jan-00 7-Jun-01 7-Jun-01 1 
United States ISXC.SERIESC 11-Aug-99 7-Nov-00 2-Nov-04 2 
    Total 15 
 
Table 7: Implied volatility indexes 
 
Note: The first column lists all of the 11 sample countries that have implied volatility indexes available 
in Datastream. The second column provides the relevant Datastream code, and the third one indicates 
the series starting date. The dates of the first and last election included as well as the total number of 
elections for each of the sample countries are reported in the following columns. 
 
 Figure 4: Average implied volatility around Election Day 
 
Note: This figure plots the average of implied volatility indexes around 15 national 
elections held in 11 countries. 
 
Fig. 4 offers compelling evidence that options tend to be more expensive in 
periods when voters cast their ballots. The average implied volatility jumps from 
31.2% five days before the election to 55.5% five days thereafter. Interestingly, not 
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much of the upward move is observed prior to the event. This may suggest that 
investors did not anticipate the extent of their surprise on the Election Day. As a 
consequence, strategies of buying straddles and strangles prior to the elections could 
have proven quite lucrative. Although a more extensive study would be needed to 
affirm the profitability, our preliminary results indicate that these volatility-based 
option trading strategies may have had some success in the past.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates the interplay between politics and finance by focusing on 
stock market volatility around national elections. The value added of this paper is 
twofold. First, it provides a detailed examination of the second moment of index 
return distribution around election dates. Since much of the uncertainty regarding 
future government policies is resolved during balloting periods, the stock prices can 
adjust dramatically and stock market volatility is likely to increase. To the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, it is the first study that rigorously quantifies the magnitude of this 
increase. Second, we stretch the limits of earlier research by overcoming the 
commonly used single-country approach and by introducing a new, extensive set of 
explanatory variables. 
 
The impact of elections on country-specific stock market volatility is assessed 
in an event-study framework. Our empirical findings indicate that, despite many 
efforts to accurately predict election outcomes, investors are still surprised by the 
ultimate distribution of votes. Stock prices react strongly in response to this surprise, 
and temporarily elevated levels of volatility are observed. These empirical 
conclusions hold irrespective of the choice of event window. Narrowing the event 
window, however, magnifies the implied percentage change in variance, suggesting 
that most of this hike is due to large market moves on the Election Day. We find that 
the country-specific component of volatility can easily double during the week 
surrounding elections. 
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To track down the main determinants of election-induced volatility, we have 
compiled an encompassing data set of political, institutional, and socio-economic 
variables. Four of the variables proved to influence the magnitude of election surprise 
in a significant way. Stock market participants tend to react in a more volatile manner 
during closely contested races, when the outcome of the election brings about a 
change in the political orientation of the government, and when governments do not 
secure parliamentary majorities. In all of these cases, investors perceive increased 
uncertainty. On the other hand, compulsory voting laws reduce the election shock. 
Enactment of such laws leads to higher voter turnout, which improves the accuracy 
of pre-election surveys and reduces the chances that the election outcome will be 
influenced by political fringe groups.  
 
Our empirical findings are robust to alternative ways of measuring excess 
volatility around the Election Day. When examining the total variance rather than its 
country-specific component, we still observe an evident jump. The statistical 
significance of this increase is reconfirmed by both parametric and non-parametric 
tests. The link between the magnitude of the election shock and the explanatory 
variables mentioned above also seems to be uncontroversial since these variables 
retain their statistical significance in alternative specifications of the regression 
equation. 
 
The implications for investors are tangible and important. Risk-averse agents 
require an adequate premium whenever they need to take on additional risks. Typical 
investors are not fully diversified internationally, and it may occasionally happen that 
they see all of their wealth invested in a country with upcoming election. Therefore, 
the investigation into whether investors are appropriately compensated for bearing 
political risk associated with elections is crucial. It turns out that the premium offered 
for the election risk is rather modest and acceptable only for investors with a 
relatively low degree of risk aversion. All other investors will attain higher expected 
utility by diversifying their portfolio internationally. Furthermore, we show that national 
elections can be considered as important events by the participants of option 
markets. In the heat of political changes, options tend to trade at higher implied 
volatilities.  
 30 
 In the light of the presented results, it becomes clear that the efforts to 
provide more accurate pre-election forecasts should still be furthered. Improvements 
in forecasting precision will help to bridge the gap between actual investors’ 
requirements and the current state of the art. With the emergence of accurate 
prediction markets, however, one could envision that advances in this field can be 
achieved in the future. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1  In addition to the aforementioned Booth and Booth (2003), Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), 
and Nofsinger (2004), several earlier papers deal with the issue of an election cycle in U.S. security 
returns. See Niederhoffer et al. (1970), Riley and Luksetich (1980), Allvine and O’Neill (1980), Herbst 
and Slinkman (1984), Huang (1985), Stovall (1992), Hensel and Ziemba (1995), Gärtner and 
Wellershoff (1995), and Johnson et al. (1999). 
 
2  See the report of O’Neill et al. (2001). 
 
3 More information about the structure of the IEM can be found at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/. 
 
4 The classification of governments into a left-wing/right-wing scheme is, of course, far from 
being uncontroversial and may be deemed subjective. Therefore, we stick closely to the conventions 
adopted in Alesina and Roubini (1992), Alt (1985), and Banks et al. (2004). 
 
5 Alternative specifications considered classified elections as “early” whenever they took place 
more than six or twelve months before the official end of the term. Changes in the definition of this 
variable, however, did not substantially alter our empirical findings. 
 
6  For the last two variables, the log transformation is applied to reduce the skewness in the 
underlying data. 
 
7 The term “special votes” is used here in relation to votes cast by individuals who, due to 
certain circumstances, are unable to get to the required polling place on the Election Day. This could, 
for instance, be the case when the registered voter is outside her electorate, is seriously ill or 
hospitalized, or her name was mistakenly omitted from the electoral roll. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A representative agent is assumed to invest all of her initial wealth 
1n
W  in risky 
assets. The investment decision is made right now (time n1), and the portfolio 
composition will remain unaltered until some future date n2 at which the investment 
will be liquidated. The agent chooses to maximize the expectation of her constant 
relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function 
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where ),(~ 21 nnR  is the cumulative, continuously compounded return on the 
portfolio over the entire investment period and ),( 21 nnγ  is the agent’s relative risk-
aversion (RRA) coefficient ( 1),( 21 ≠nnγ ). Note that, although the RRA coefficient is 
allowed to vary across different investment horizons, for any fixed horizon it does not 
change across different investment alternatives.  
 
Given the normality of ),(~ 21 nnR , the expression for the expected utility of 
terminal wealth can be derived using a formula for the expected value of log-normal 
distribution: 
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Suppose further that elections are scheduled to take place in the agent’s 
home country during her investment period (n1,n2). It is assumed for simplicity that 
the agent can pursue only two mutually exclusive strategies. She could either invest 
domestically or diversify her portfolio internationally. Her expected utility is influenced 
by this choice of strategy as follows: 
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 wher
e ),(~ 21 nnRi  and ),(
~
21
* nnR  denote the cumulative log return on the stock market index 
in the election country and the cumulative log return on the global stock market 
index, respectively. 
 
In the case when ( )[ ]21 ,~ nnRE i  ≠ ( )[ ]21* ,~ nnRE  and ( )[ ]21 ,~ nnRVar i  ≠ 
( )[ ]21* ,~ nnRVar , the agent will be indifferent between the two investment alternatives if 
and only if her risk-aversion coefficient ( )21 ,nnγ  is equal to a break-point RRA 
coefficient ( )21 ,nnBγ , such that 
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 Solving the above equation for ( )21 ,nnBγ  yields 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]21*2121*2121 ,~,~,~,~21, nnRVarnnRVarnnREnnREnn iiB −÷−+=γ . (A.5) 
 
It can be shown that, in the presence of election-induced volatility 
( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]( )0,~,~i.e. 21*21 >− nnRVarnnRVar i , the agent’s optimal investment decision can 
be described as  
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>
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Eq. (A.5) provides insights into the estimation of the break-point relative risk-
aversion coefficient ( )21 ,nnBγ  from the underlying data. Given that ( )21 , nnCAR  is 
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defined as cumulative excess return on the domestic market index over the 
international one, the estimator of ( )21 ,nnBγ  can be written as 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ][ ]21*212121 ,~ˆ,~ˆ,21,ˆ nnRraVnnRraVnnCARnn iB −÷+=γ , (A.7) 
 
 where ( )[ ]21 ,~ˆ nnRraV i  and ( )[ ]21* ,~ˆ nnRraV  denote the estimates of cross-
sectional variances of cumulative log returns on the domestic and global stock 
market indexes, respectively.  
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